

within the FM baseband signal (*see* 47 CFR 73.295), and signals transmitted within the Vertical Blanking Interval of a broadcast television signal; and

(4) Applications for frequencies used as an intermediate link or links in the provision of a continuous, end-to-end service where no service is provided directly to subscribers over the frequencies. Examples of such intermediate links are:

(i) Point-to-point microwave facilities used to connect a cellular radio telephone base station with a cellular radio telephone mobile telephone switching office; and

(ii) Point-to-point microwave facilities used as part of the service offering in the provision of telephone exchange or interexchange service.

(c) Applications in the following services or classes of services are not subject to competitive bidding:

(1) Alaska-Private Fixed Stations (*see* 47 CFR part 80, subpart O);

(2) Broadcast radio (AM and FM) and broadcast television (VHF, UHF, LPTV) under 47 CFR part 73;

(3) Broadcast Auxiliary and Cable Television Relay Services (*see* 47 CFR part 74, subparts D, E, F, G, H and L and part 78, subpart B);

(4) Instructional Television Fixed Service (*see* 47 CFR part 74, subpart I);

(5) Maritime Support Stations (*see* 47 CFR part 80, subpart N);

(6) Marine Operational Fixed Stations (*see* 47 CFR part 80, subpart L);

(7) Marine Radiodetermination Stations (*see* 47 CFR part 80, subpart M);

(8) Personal Radio Services (*see* 47 CFR part 95), except applications filed after July 26, 1993, in the Interactive Video Data Service (*see* 47 CFR part 95, subpart F);

(9) Public Safety, Industrial/Land Transportation, General and Business Radio categories above 800 MHz, including finder's preference requests for frequencies not allocated to the SMR service (*see* 47 CFR 90.173), and including, until further notice of the Commission, the Automated Vehicle Monitoring Service (*see* 47 CFR 90.239);

(10) Private Land Mobile Radio Services between 470–512 MHz (*see* 47 CFR part 90, subparts B–F), including those based on finder's preferences, (*see* 47 CFR 90.173);

(11) Private Land Mobile Radio Services below 470 MHz (*see* 47 CFR part 90, subparts B–F) except in the 220 MHz band (*see* 47 CFR part 90, subpart T), including those based on finder's preferences (*see* 47 CFR §90.173); and

(12) Private Operational Fixed Services (*see* 47 CFR part 94).

[59 FR 44293, Aug. 26, 1994, as amended at 60 FR 40718, Aug. 9, 1995]

§ 1.2103 Competitive bidding design options.

(a) The Commission will select the competitive bidding design(s) to be used in auctioning particular licenses or classes of licenses on a service-specific basis. The choice of competitive bidding design will generally be made pursuant to the criteria set forth in PP Docket No. 93–253, FCC 94–61, adopted March 8, 1994, available for purchase from the International Transcription Service, Inc., 2100 M St. NW, suite 140, Washington, DC 20037, telephone (202) 857–3800, but the Commission may design and test alternative methodologies. The Commission will choose from one or more of the following types of auction designs for services or classes of services subject to competitive bidding: (1) Single round sealed bid auctions (either sequential or simultaneous); (2) Sequential oral auctions; (3) Simultaneous multiple round auctions.

(b) The Commission may use combinatorial bidding, which would allow bidders to submit all or nothing bids on combinations of licenses, in addition to bids on individual licenses. The Commission may require that to be declared the high bid, a combinatorial bid must exceed the sum of the individual bids by a specified amount. Combinatorial bidding may be used with any type of auction.

(c) The Commission may use single combined auctions, which combine bidding for two or more substitutable licenses and award licenses to the highest bidders until the available licenses are exhausted. This technique may be used in conjunction with any type of auction.

§ 1.2104 Competitive bidding mechanisms.

(a) *Sequencing.* The Commission will establish the sequence in which multiple licenses will be auctioned.

(b) *Grouping.* In the event the Commission uses either a simultaneous multiple round competitive bidding design or combinatorial bidding, the Commission will determine which licenses will be auctioned simultaneously or in combination.

(c) *Reservation Price.* The Commission may establish a reservation price, either disclosed or undisclosed, below which a license subject to auction will not be awarded.

(d) *Minimum Bid Increments.* The Commission may, by announcement before or during an auction, require minimum bid increments in dollar or percentage terms. The Commission may also establish suggested minimum opening bids on a service-specific basis.

(e) *Stopping Rules.* The Commission may establish stopping rules before or during multiple round auctions in order to terminate the auctions within a reasonable time.

(f) *Activity Rules.* The Commission may establish activity rules which require a minimum amount of bidding activity.

(g) *Withdrawal, Default and Disqualification Penalties.* As specified below, when the Commission conducts a simultaneous multiple round auction pursuant to § 1.2103, the Commission will impose penalties on bidders who withdraw high bids during the course of an auction, or who default on payments due after an auction closes or who are disqualified.

(1) Bid withdrawal prior to close of auction. A bidder who withdraws a high bid during the course of an auction will be subject to a penalty equal to the difference between the amount bid and the amount of the winning bid the next time the license is offered by the Commission. No withdrawal penalty would be assessed if the subsequent winning bid exceeds the withdrawn bid. This penalty amount will be deducted from any upfront payments or down payments that the withdrawing bidder has deposited with the Commission.

(2) Default or disqualification after close of auction. If a high bidder defaults or is disqualified after the close of such an auction, the defaulting bidder will be subject to the penalty in paragraph (g)(1) plus an additional penalty equal to 3 percent of the subsequent winning bid. If the subsequent winning bid exceeds the defaulting bidder's bid amount, the 3 percent penalty will be calculated based on the defaulting bidder's bid amount. These amounts will be deducted from any upfront payments or down payments that the defaulting or disqualified bidder has deposited with the Commission. When the Commission conducts single round sealed bid auctions or sequential oral auctions, the Commission may modify the penalties to be paid in the event of bid withdrawal, default or disqualification; provided, however, that such penalties shall not exceed the penalties specified above.

(h) The Commission will generally release information concerning the identities of bidders before each auction but may choose, on an auction-by-auction basis, to withhold the identity of the bidders associated with bidder identification numbers.

(i) The Commission may delay, suspend, or cancel an auction in the event of a natural disaster, technical obstacle, evidence of security breach, unlawful bidding activity, administrative necessity, or for any other reason that affects the fair and efficient conduct of the competitive bidding. The Commission also has the authority, at its sole discretion, to resume the competitive bidding starting from the beginning of the current or some previous round or cancel the competitive bidding in its entirety.

§ 1.2105 Bidding application and certification procedures; prohibition of collusion.

(a) *Submission of Short Form Application (FCC Form 175).* In order to be eligible to bid, an applicant must timely submit a short-form application (FCC Form 175), together with any appropriate filing fee set forth by Public Notice. Unless otherwise provided by Public Notice, the Form 175 need not be accompanied by an upfront payment (see § 1.2106).